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This paper investigates the international dimension of productivity and de-
mand shocks in the US using sign restrictions based on standard theory
predictions. Identifying shocks to US manufacturing ￿ our measure of trad-
ables ￿ we ￿nd that productivity gains have substantial aggregate demand
e⁄ects, boosting US consumption and investment, relative to the rest of the
world, thus raising real imports; net exports and US net foreign assets cor-
respondingly decrease. At the same time, however, these shocks appreciate
the US real exchange rate, improve the terms of trade and raise stock prices.
Shocks to the demand for US manufacturing appear to have less pronounced
aggregate e⁄ects, with little impact on trade and capital accounts; they lead
to a (delayed) dollar appreciation, however. Our ￿ndings provide novel ev-
idence on key channels of the international transmission of shocks, pointing
to a low degree of consumption risk sharing as an essential feature of the
transmission mechanism, and suggesting that strong wealth e⁄ects play an
important role in generating aggregate demand ￿ uctuations across countries.
JEL classi￿cation: F32, F41, F42
Keywords: International transmission mechanism, terms of trade, real
exchange rates, VAR, sign restrictions, US current account.
expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect the positions
of the ECB, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or any other
institutions with which the authors are a¢ liated.1 Introduction
What are the consequences of shocks bringing about an economic expansion
in the United States for variables shaping its international dimension, such
as the real value of the dollar, US trade ￿ ows and International Investment
Position, as well as the relative value of US assets? A widespread view in pol-
icy and market circles is that a US expansion, associated with consumption,
investment, and possibly stock market booms, leads to real dollar appreci-
ation, and a deterioration of the external balance. This view appears to ￿t
well important recent episodes of high US output and productivity growth,
accompanied by large upward swings in the dollar real exchange rate and
current account de￿cits.1 Intriguing empirical evidence consistent with it is
also provided by several studies documenting that positive surprises about
the US business cycle tend to strengthen the US currency, negative ones to
weaken it ￿ e.g., see Andersen et al. [2003] and the recent survey by Engel
et al. [2007].
This popular view is typically associated with traditional models that
stress real demand disturbances and their transmission via competitiveness
channels ￿ such as the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch (MFD) framework. In
this framework, a real demand increase appreciates the currency in nominal
and real terms, thus crowding out net exports. As explicitly recognized by
Dornbusch [1980], however, the MFD framework does not account for en-
dogenous wealth and demand e⁄ects in the international transmission.2 By
adopting an explicit intertemporal utility maximization framework to endoge-
nize these e⁄ects, the same popular view can indeed be articulated coherently
with modern open-economy theory, stressing di⁄erent structural shocks and
tracing their propagation through endogenous demand movements in general
equilibrium ￿ demand and wealth e⁄ects obtain via a variety of real and ￿-
1On average, US cyclical output and consumption expansions are indeed positively
correlated with trade de￿cits, real exchange rate appreciation and terms of trade improve-
ment, a point implied by the ￿ndings by Backus and Smith [1993] and Corsetti, Dedola
and Leduc [2008].
2This issue is at the heart of the debate on the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler e⁄ect, re-
volving around the relationship between aggregate spending, the current account and the
terms of trade ￿ see e.g. Obstfeld [1982] and Svensson and Razin [1983]. In the words of
the former author, ￿Laursen and Metzler adopted the Keynesian assumption￿of a stable
relationship between current real income and consumption, arguing that ￿a deterioration
of the terms of trade, which lowers real income, must lower saving as well,￿resulting in a
current account de￿cit. (Obstfeld [1982], pp. 251-252)
1nancial channels, including the dynamics of saving and investment, relative
prices, asset returns and portfolio allocation.
While there are many empirical studies characterizing the US and the
international business cycles, relatively little work has been devoted to struc-
tural investigations of the international dimension of US business cycle im-
pulses, with the exception of monetary and ￿scal policy shocks.3 Structural
studies emphasizing other important drivers of the business cycles are clearly
needed to shed light on speci￿c aspects of the transmission mechanism, and
to provide guidance on the empirical content of di⁄erent theories.
As a contribution towards this goal, this paper documents the e⁄ects of
productivity and demand shocks in the United States on a broad range of
internal and external macroeconomic variables: absorption, trade, interna-
tional relative prices, asset prices and foreign asset positions. Using structural
VARs, we identify productivity and demand shocks via the sign-restriction
methodology adopted by Canova and De Nicol￿ [2002], Uhlig [2005], and
Dedola and Neri [2007]. Namely, we impose intuitive, theory-based restric-
tions, consistent with a large class of models, on the sign of the impulse
responses of a small subset of variables. Our focus is deliberately on shocks
to US manufacturing relative to manufacturing in the rest of the industrial
world. Since manufactures account for a large share of international trade,
they arguably play a key role in shaping macroeconomic interdependence
across countries. Most importantly, we take advantage of the fact that the-
ory￿ s predictions are quite clear-cut for shocks hitting tradables. As discussed
in Section 2, focusing on manufacturing facilitates identi￿cation, and avoid
potentially di¢ cult issues in the interpretation of the results.
Our estimates show that productivity shocks to US manufacturing have
signi￿cant e⁄ects on US aggregate demand: consistent with the predictions of
the intertemporal-trade approach to the current account, they persistently
increase US aggregate consumption and investment relative to the rest of
the world, raising imports and worsening the US trade balance ￿ the trade
de￿cit turns out to be quite long-lasting. Most interestingly, productivity
shocks cause real appreciation, rather than depreciation, in all our measures
of the international relative prices of US goods, namely, a CPI-based, a PPI-
based and an export-de￿ ator-based real exchange rate ￿ the latter being
3Using structural VAR methods, an important and extensive literature analyzes the
open economy e⁄ects of US policy shocks, both monetary (e.g. Eichenbaum and Evans
[1995], and Kim and Roubini [2005], among others) and ￿scal (Kim and Roubini [2008]
and Corsetti and Muller [2006], among others).
2constructed to proxy for bilateral terms of trade. In other words, the real
dollar appreciation triggered by a positive productivity shock to tradables
is not exclusively due to a rise in the relative price of US nontradables￿
according to the classical Harrod-Balassa Samuelson e⁄ects ￿ , but also to
an improvement in the US terms of trade. Note that, in line with Engel
[1999], these ￿ndings imply that movements in traded goods prices are major
drivers of the dollar real exchange rate.
Productivity shocks also raise the value of the US stock market relative to
an aggregate index of foreign markets ￿ between 2 to 7 percent; they open
a positive nominal interest di⁄erentials in favor of the US over time, with a
delay of a few quarters. Using the series of valuation-adjusted US Foreign
assets and liabilities computed by Gourinchas and Rey [2007], we ￿nd that
in addition to deteriorating net trade, asymmetric productivity gains worsen
the US net foreign asset position relative to GDP. Most notably, the fall in US
net foreign wealth corresponds to an increase in both gross assets and gross
liabilities, also relative to GDP. The increase in gross foreign assets in dollar
terms is intriguing, in light of the ￿nding that the exchange rate appreciates.
As most of the US foreign assets are denominated in foreign currency, a dollar
appreciation tends to reduce the relative value of outstanding assets: the rise
of this stock must be then driven by some combination of capital gains in
foreign currency, and positive purchases by US residents.
Concerning demand shocks to US manufacturing, we ￿nd that they typ-
ically have the expected qualitative e⁄ects, but, quantitatively, tend to be
not very consequential for macroeconomic dynamics. In response to a rela-
tive increase in demand for US manufacturing, all US international relative
prices strengthen, though only with some delay; aggregate investment rises,
although by less than in response to productivity shocks. The e⁄ects on con-
sumption, trade balance, gross and net external asset positions, stock prices
and interest di⁄erentials are all subdued.
Overall, these ￿ndings square quite well with the market and policy view
of the international dimension of US favorable shocks. At the same time, how-
ever, they provide novel evidence on key channels of the international trans-
mission of structural shocks working through relative demand and wealth.
Speci￿cally, while we ￿nd that a lasting increase in the productivity of trad-
ables is accompanied by a current account de￿cit ￿ as predicted by the
intertemporal-trade approach ￿ the simultaneous appreciation of the price
of domestic consumption (the real exchange rate) and exports (proxying for
the terms of trade) points to signi￿cant e⁄ects on relative wealth and de-
3mand. Wealth and price e⁄ects in response to supply disturbances consistent
with our ￿ndings are stressed by recent theoretical contributions to the open
economy literature, such as Ghironi and Melitz [2006] and previous work
of ours, Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc [2008]. In the latter contribution, for
instance, provided that international ￿nancial markets are incomplete and
cross-country risk insurance is limited, persistent productivity and output
booms in a large, relatively closed country like the United States can induce
substantial movements in cross-country wealth and demand that cause both
the trade balance to deteriorate and the international price of domestic goods
to appreciate. Remarkably, these models show that the international dimen-
sion of (persistent) technology shocks is similar to that of demand shocks
according to the MFD framework.4
This paper relates to a small but signi￿cant empirical literature. In no-
table early work, Clarida and Gal￿ [1994] used long-run restrictions to identify
aggregate demand and supply shocks and their e⁄ects on the real exchange
rate, and cross-country GDP and in￿ ation di⁄erentials for the US vis-￿-vis
the other G7 countries. In previous work (Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [2006]),
we used long-run restrictions to identify technology shocks in the manufac-
turing sector in a sample of ￿ve G7 countries, and found their e⁄ects on US
relative prices and net trade to be similar to those of productivity shocks
above. Here, we propose a novel identi￿cation strategy, and focusing on the
US experience, we expand considerably the scope of the analysis, by sys-
tematically documenting real and ￿nancial e⁄ects of productivity, as well as
demand shocks in the US manufacturing sector.5 Finally, this paper di⁄ers
from contributions such as Canova, Ciccarelli and Ortega [2007], which thor-
oughly characterizes the empirical features of business cycle comovements
among the G7 countries. We instead document in detail the international di-
mension of identi￿ed US shocks, tracing the key channels of the international
transmission mechanism.
4Conversely, our empirical ￿ndings are di¢ cult to reconcile with seminal contributions
to the modern literature ￿ not only the international real business cycle literature (e.g. see
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland [1995] and Stockman and Tesar [1995]), but also the sticky
price literature (e.g., see Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [1995] and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
[2002]) ￿ which have been developed either under the assumption of complete markets,
or using speci￿cations implying a very high degree of international risk sharing. This point
is discussed in detail in Section 2.1.
5The sign-restriction methodology is also adopted by Enders et al. [2008] for the
study of the US real exchange rate dynamics, leading to results for this variable which ￿
accounting for di⁄erences in identi￿cation ￿ are broadly in line with ours.
4The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y reviews the inter-
national transmission mechanism in standard theoretical and quantitative
models, identifying alternative views and empirical predictions on which we
base our sign restrictions and de￿ne the key questions our empirical analysis
will address. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical methodology.
Section 4 reports and analyzes in detail our main ￿ndings, while Section 5
presents some sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes. An appendix de-
scribes the data.
2 Using theory insights to identify produc-
tivity and demand shocks
In this section we motivate and lay out the theoretical underpinnings of our
approach to identi￿cation. Our identi￿cation strategy via sign restrictions
consists of focusing on a minimal set of theoretical predictions on the direc-
tion of key variables￿responses to a given shock, which are consistent with
a large class of analytical frameworks. In other words, our identi￿cation
scheme only hinges on restrictions to variables whose behavior in response
to shocks is both unambiguous according to theory and fairly uncontrover-
sial. Conversely, the response of variables for which theory presents a fairly
wide range of predictions is left unconstrained ￿ as to reconsider theoretical
controversies in light of the results from the analysis.
2.1 Identi￿cation strategy
Our strategy builds on a straightforward idea: supply-side shifts should move
relative prices and quantities in opposite directions, while demand shifts move
them in the same direction. Since this idea is especially powerful when ap-
plied to sector- or industry-speci￿c shocks,6 a natural focus for studies of
the international transmission mechanism is on the tradable sector, which
we identify with manufacturing. In most open economy models, both pro-
ductivity and demand shocks in this sector increase relative tradable out-
put; however, productivity gains unambiguously raise the relative price of
6It is more problematic to identify demand and supply shifts by looking at movements in
the level of prices and aggregate quantities ￿ especially because this requires conditioning
on a given monetary policy response to shocks.
5nontradables ￿ a well-known prediction of the standard Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson theory; demand shocks unambiguously reduce it. Thus, we can
use the domestic relative price of nontradable in terms of tradables as the
key relative price variable in the identi￿cation scheme. As explained in Sec-
tion 2.2, this choice is superior to the alternative of using an international
relative price, like the terms of trade. This is because theory￿ s predictions on
the response of the international prices to shocks are conditional on strong
assumptions about the amount of cross-country insurance, the functioning
of international ￿nancial markets and more generally on the international
transmission mechanism ￿ whose investigation is instead the main objective
of our study.
Moreover, focusing on manufacturing not only facilitates identi￿cation,
but also avoids potentially di¢ cult issues in the interpretation of the results,
relative to the alternative of analyzing economy-wide shocks with unspeci￿ed
industry origin. In this alternative, the response of many macro (internal
and external) variables, including relative prices, would indeed be sensitive,
among other things, to the distribution of shocks across the tradable and
the nontradable sector. In other words, interpreting empirical results would
require additional and possibly controversial assumptions about the relative
importance of aggregate disturbances in each sector.7
By the same token, consistent with our interest in tracing the external
e⁄ects of shocks to isolate the channels of international transmission, our
analysis should naturally focus on those shocks hitting the US asymmetrically
vis-￿-vis the rest of the world. Failure to impose this requirement would raise
issues in interpretation of shocks of unspeci￿ed geographic origin, similar to
the one discussed above.8
Our identi￿cation scheme is detailed below.
7For instance, suppose that we ￿nd a positive association between the level of the US
economy-wide labor productivity and a terms of trade deterioration. It would be quite
di¢ cult to infer that the depreciation is evidence in favor of a particular transmission
mechanism without knowing whether the productivity increase is concentrated in tradables
or nontradables, and the extent to which the distribution of shocks is stable over time.
8The interpretation of the international repercussions of global shocks would again
require auxiliary assumptions on their distribution and consequences across countries.
For instance, suppose that we ￿nd a positive association between the level of US labor
productivity and the US trade de￿cit. Could we infer that this is evidence in support
of the intertemporal approach to the current account? Unfortunately, the answer to this
question is ￿ No￿ . Without controlling for movements in foreign productivity we could not
reach this conclusion, as e.g. forcefully argued by Glick and Rogo⁄ [1995].
6Productivity in US manufacturing The ￿rst shock under consideration
consists of supply shocks increasing labor productivity in the US manufactur-
ing sector, relative to that in the rest of the world. To identify these shocks
we postulate a set of four restrictions. Positive supply shocks should: (1)
Raise (the log of) manufacturing output relative to aggregate output in the
US; (2) Lower the relative price of manufacturing ￿ in accordance with the
Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) e⁄ect; (3) Raise US manufacturing output
relative to Foreign manufacturing output; and (4) Raise US labor productiv-
ity relative to Foreign labor productivity in manufacturing.
As explained above, the theoretical underpinning of restrictions (1) and
(2) is that supply shifts move price and quantity in opposite direction: ac-
cording to standard Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson theory, productivity gains
in tradables should increase the domestic price of nontradables in terms of
tradables. Restriction (3) isolates shocks with US-speci￿c e⁄ects. The last
restriction ensures that our identi￿ed supply shocks are associated with an
increase in relative labor productivity, as it would be the case with standard
technology shocks analyzed by the international real business cycle (IRBC)
literature. All other variables included in our analysis, namely, aggregate
consumption and investment, trade variables, capital ￿ ows, international rel-
ative prices and asset prices, are left unconstrained, so that the external
consequences of productivity shocks can be traced in the data.
Demand for US manufacturing The second shock under consideration
consists of demand shifts in favor of US manufacturing goods, relative to
all other goods and services produced in the US. The identi￿cation of these
shocks is based on a set of three restrictions. Positive demand shocks speci￿c
to US manufacturing goods should: (1) Raise manufacturing output relative
to aggregate output in the US; (2) Raise the relative price of manufacturing
in terms of other goods in the economy; and (3) Raise US manufacturing
output relative to Foreign manufacturing output.
Restrictions (1) and (2) now capture the theoretical prior that demand
shifts move price and quantity in the same direction (rather than in opposite
directions, as is the case for productivity shocks); restriction (3) instead
isolates shocks that are speci￿c to US tradable production, relative to the
other countries in our sample. All other variables included in our analysis are,
again, left unconstrained, as to trace the external consequences of demand
shocks in the data.
7Caveats and quali￿cations The two sets of restrictions de￿ned above can
be derived from a vast majority of models in the literature. One example
which, building on Corsetti and Pesenti [2001], can be solved in closed-form
is provided by the stochastic model by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [2000]. Other
examples are provided by standard IRBC models like that in Stockman and
Tesar [1995], or in related work of ours (Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc, [2008]).
We are well aware of the fact that no identi￿cation scheme is ironclad.
For instance, our productivity shocks clearly capture exogenous shifts in the
production function due to technology improvements. Yet, to the extent that
measured labor productivity is endogenous, e.g. because of labor hoarding,
these shocks could also correspond to other supply disturbances which do
not immediately shift the production function, like embodied capital shocks
or labor supply shocks.
A potential risk in our analysis is due to the fact that di⁄erent sup-
ply shocks with similar e⁄ects on restricted variables may elicit opposite
responses of unconstrained variables. In this case, it could be possible that
our identi￿ed shocks end up having no signi￿cant estimated e⁄ects on un-
constrained external variables. Lack of detectable e⁄ects would clearly raise
serious interpretation issues.
However, to the extent that our analysis does recover some responses with
a high degree of probability, our results provide model builders with quite
useful evidence. For a candidate shock to be the main driver of our results,
it should be able to account for both the estimated responses of constrained
variables, e.g. an increase in labor productivity, as well as the response of
any other unconstrained variables we ￿nd in the data.
2.2 International prices and risk sharing in the inter-
national transmission mechanism
As discussed in the introduction, the idea that US expansions cause real dol-
lar appreciation and deteriorate the external balance is widespread in market
and policy circle, and well in line with traditional Keynesian models stress-
ing real demand disturbances and competitiveness e⁄ects. According to the
Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch framework, these e⁄ects are due to real demand
booms that in part fall on imported goods and appreciate the currency in
nominal and real terms; the appreciation in turn makes domestic goods more
expensive, crowding out exports.
8Seminal contributions to the modern literature placing emphasis on sup-
ply disturbances ￿ e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland [1995] and Stockman
and Tesar [1995] for the international real business cycle IRBC literature,
and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [1995] and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [2002] for
the sticky price literature ￿ also predicts that the rise in domestic demand
(absorption) during output booms may cause net exports to deteriorate ￿
essentially due to the dynamic interplay between saving and investment.
However, these contributions envision a di⁄erent behavior of relative prices:
in a boom, the price of exports in terms of imports ￿ i.e. the country￿ s
terms of trade ￿ should worsen, and the exchange rate should depreciate
in real terms. The key reason for this prediction is that these models have
been developed either under the assumption of complete markets, or using
speci￿cations implying a high degree of international risk sharing.
To see the link between risk sharing and the response of international
prices to shocks, recall that, with full consumption-risk insurance, the ratio
of marginal utility of consumption across any two countries is proportional
to the relative price of consumption in the two countries, i.e. their bilateral





P ￿ = ￿ ￿ RER (1)
Here, C denotes domestic consumption, U0(:) marginal utility, and P and
P ￿ the domestic and the foreign price levels, expressed in terms of the same
numØraire. Under standard assumptions about preferences, the above condi-
tion implies that domestic consumption can rise relative to foreign consump-
tion only if its relative price is low, i.e. the real exchange rate simultaneously
depreciates.
Since the price levels is a function of the price of nontradables PN and
the price of tradable PT, for our purpose it is convenient to rewrite the above
condition referring to the well-known decomposition of the CPI-based real
exchange rate between a ￿rst component due to the relative price of tradables
across countries, in turn a function of the terms of trade, and a second












Consider the case of a domestic boom generated by productivity gains in the
tradable sector. According to the HBS e⁄ect, these gains actually increase
the domestic price of nontradables in terms of tradables, PN=PT. If the
international relative price of domestic tradables PT=PT ￿ did not move, the
higher price of nontradables due to the HBS e⁄ect would make domestic con-
sumption more expensive relative to foreign consumption, thus appreciating
the domestic real exchange rate. But we have seen above that this cannot
happen under perfect risk sharing: by the condition (2), domestic consump-
tion can rise with a domestic productivity shocks to tradables only if the real
exchange rate simultaneously depreciates. It follows that the international
price of domestic tradables must necessarily worsen.10
Speci￿cally, the international price of domestically produced tradables ￿
i.e. the domestic terms of trade ￿ must fall enough as to outweigh the HBS
e⁄ect on the relative price of domestic nontradables, up to causing an over-
all depreciation of the real exchange rate.11 We stress here that the same is
true in models assuming incomplete markets, yet envisioning allocations that
are close to perfect risk sharing, in the sense that they predict a counterfac-
tual positive and high correlation between relative consumption and the real
exchange rate ￿ see Cole and Obstfeld [1991], Chari, Kehoe, McGrattan
[2002], and our discussion in Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [2008].
Once the assumptions generating a high degree of risk sharing are relaxed,
however, condition (2) no longer determines the equilibrium comovements
of relative consumption and the real exchange rate. Without transfers of


















where ￿ is the share of traded goods in consumption.
10Observe that this must be so independently of the shock persistence, trade elasticity
and home bias in domestic demand.
11It is easy to verify that a similar argument goes through also in models without
nontradables, but home bias in consumption. In this case, the real exchange rate is only
a direct function of the terms of trade. Then, a productivity shock raising domestic
consumption cannot but depreciate both international prices.
10income via insurance contracts, persistent productivity shocks in the tradable
sector can create sizeable wedges in relative wealth and demand. A large
response of domestic absorption to productivity gains can strengthen the
international price of domestic tradable goods, moving the terms of trade
in the same direction as the price of nontradables, and thus complementing,
rather than o⁄setting, the HBS e⁄ect. In this respect, it is worth noting that a
positive correlation between domestic consumption with terms of trade and
real exchange rate appreciation ￿ in violation of the perfect risk-sharing
condition (2) ￿ is found by a large body of empirical evidence following the
work of Backus and Smith [1993].
Similar considerations apply to shocks to the demand for domestic trad-
ables. Relative to the case of productivity disturbances, a shift in demand for
these goods should increase their price both relative to the price of domestic
nontradables and relative to the price of foreign tradable goods: other things
equal, the ￿rst price movement translates into a depreciation of the real ex-
change rate; the second into a real appreciation. Which of the two e⁄ects
prevails depends once again on the degree of risk insurance. If markets are
complete (as long as the shock raises domestic relative to foreign consump-
tion, without otherwise shifting marginal utilities), the overall outcome can-
not be but a real depreciation: the domestic relative price movement cannot
be outweighed by the terms of trade movement. If markets are incomplete,
either outcome is possible.
These theoretical results thus provide a tight backdrop for our empirical
analysis. On the one hand, they support the notion that the domestic rela-
tive price of manufacturing goods ￿ our measure of tradables ￿ is a natural
candidate for identi￿cation via sign restrictions, independently of the degree
of international risk sharing. On the other hand, the same discussion quali-
￿es both the real exchange rate and the terms of trade as natural candidates
for the list of variables, including net exports, consumption and investment,
which should be included as key variables in empirical study of the interna-
tional transmission of business cycle impulses, and left unconstrained in the
analysis.
3 The empirical framework
In our analysis, we adopt the VAR methods using sign restrictions similarly
to Faust [1998], Uhlig [2005], Canova and De Nicol￿ [2002] for monetary
11policy shocks, Dedola and Neri [2007] for technology shocks, and Mountford
and Uhlig [2005] for ￿scal policy shocks. We go over the main elements below,
starting with the data sample and the VAR speci￿cation, and going into the
details of the identi￿cation.
Our study analyzes the US vis-￿-vis an aggregate of the other G7 countries
(Japan, Germany, the UK, and Italy, Canada and France) and three other
OECD countries (Australia, Sweden and Ireland) for which we were able to
build quarterly data on hourly labor productivity in manufacturing.12 As in
section 2, we refer to this aggregate as the ￿ Rest of the World￿(ROW). All
ROW￿ s variables are built as an aggregate of the above mentioned countries
(excluding the US), weighted according to their respective (time-varying)
GDP shares at PPP values.13
In order to identify shocks which have asymmetric e⁄ects across countries,
we follow a common approach in the empirical literature: in the tradition of
empirical open-economy macroeconomics, we measure all variables (but trade
and domestic relative prices) in terms of cross-country di⁄erentials (see Clar-
ida and Gal￿ [1994] and Glick and Rogo⁄ [1995]). As is well understood, the
alternative of expanding the empirical system to include both US and ROW
variables has the clear disadvantage of running quickly against the constraint
imposed by data availability, exhausting any degree of freedom in the em-
pirical analysis. A potential issue in working with cross-country di⁄erentials
is raised by the (implicit) assumption of symmetry across economic areas ￿
an assumption which is clearly unappealing in studies focused on small open
economies. In our case, however, a symmetry assumption is not obviously
consequential, as we compare a large country such as the US, with a large
aggregate of OECD countries ￿ we will return on this issue in Section 5.14
So, we examine the e⁄ects of productivity and demand shocks to the US
manufacturing sector, on relative consumption and investment, trade and
capital ￿ ows, the real exchange rate, the terms of trade and asset prices ￿
12These 10 countries add up to roughly half of world GDP at PPP values, so they
represent a substantial sample of the global economy. Moreover, trade ￿ ows among them
also amount to over a half of their respective total trade, on average. For instance, the
US trade share with the other 9 countries in our sample is around 60 percent of US total
trade.
13We use GDP shares as trade weights were not available for all countries going back to
1973.
14In our robustness exercises, we will check the symmetry assumption by enlarging our
benchmark speci￿cation to include country variables in level.
12we leave a detailed description of the data sources to the data appendix. The
sample period is 1973 - 2004, covering the developments in the international
monetary system after the collapse of Bretton Woods (and the longest period
for which we have data).
We estimate several speci￿cations of the following reduced form VAR
model (omitting the constant):
Yt = B (L)Yt￿1 + Ut; (3)
where the vector Y includes the n variables of interest in levels and B (L) is
a lag polynomial of order p. The covariance matrix of the vector of reduced-
form residuals Ut is denoted by ￿. In our speci￿cations (unless stated oth-
erwise), the vector Yt is 6x1. Following a common practice in open-economy
VAR studies, we deal with the curse of dimensionality (due to including
too many variables with relatively short samples), by keeping the ￿rst ￿ve
variables in Yt ￿xed, while changing the sixth and last variable across speci-
￿cations.
The ￿rst ￿ve variables in Yt are as follows: (i) (the log of) quarterly labor
productivity in US manufacturing, in deviation from quarterly labor pro-
ductivity in manufacturing in the ROW; (ii) the US index of manufacturing
production and (iii) aggregate private consumption, both in deviation from
the same variable for the ROW; (iv) (the log of) the relative US domestic
producer price index over the services consumer price index; and (v) (the log
of) real US manufacturing output over US real GDP.
The sixth and last variable in Yt is, in turn, real private investment in the
US relative to ROW; the ratio of US nominal net export over US nominal
GDP and US real imports and exports of goods; the ratio of US external asset






i = CPI; PPI and Export Deflator:
The price indexes Pt(i) and P ￿
t (i) are alternatively (the log) of the CPI, PPI
and export-de￿ ator in dollars. Note that P ￿(i) is built as a PPP, GDP-
weighted aggregate of prices for the countries included in ROW. Finally,
we also look at the responses of relative equity prices in common currency
and short-term interest rate di⁄erentials, where the ROW aggregates are
computed as above.
13Our empirical implementation closely follows Uhlig [2005]. As is well-
known, the reduced form (3) can be estimated consistently using ordinary
least squares (OLS), which, conditional on Gaussian innovations Ut and ini-
tial conditions, amount to maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation.
In the structural VAR literature, identi￿cation amounts to providing
enough restrictions as to solve uniquely for the following decomposition of
the n￿n estimated covariance matrix of the reduced-form VAR residuals ￿




This matrix equation de￿nes a one-to-one mapping from the vector of or-
thogonal structural shocks V to the reduced form residuals U, U = A0V:
Because of the orthogonality assumption, and the symmetry of ￿, at least
n(n￿1)
2 restrictions on A0 need to be imposed.15
The j-th column of the identi￿cation matrix A0, A0;j, is called an impulse
vector in Rn, as it maps the innovation to the j-th structural shock vj into
the contemporaneous, impact responses of all the n variables, ￿0;j. With
the structural impulse vector A0;j in hand, the set of all structural impulse
responses of the n variables up to the horizon k; ￿1;j;:::;￿k;j can then be





Bs￿h￿h;j; s ￿ 1;Bs￿h = 0;s ￿ h ￿ p;
￿0;j = A0;j:
Proposition 1 in Uhlig [2005] shows that any structural impulse vector
A0;j arising from a given identifying matrix A0 can be represented as Pq; for
an appropriate vector q belonging to the hypersphere of unitary radius Sn ￿
Rn, and an arbitrary matrix P such that PP0 = ￿: For instance, natural
candidates for the orthogonal decomposition P are either the eigenvalue-
eigenvector or the Cholesky decomposition of ￿.
Our procedure to obtain estimates of impulse responses consistent with a
given set of assumed sign restrictions can be described as follows. Economic
theory can be brought to bear, as in Uhlig [2005] or Dedola and Neri [2007],
to attribute all the probability mass to the event that the responses of m ￿ n
15E.g., see Hamilton [1994], chapter 11.
14variables (e.g., relative labor productivity, relative output and so on) to the
speci￿c structural shock of interest have a given (positive or negative) sign
for s ￿ k quarters. For instance, Uhlig [2005] appeals to standard monetary
theory and assumes that a contractionary monetary policy shock in the US
uniquely brings about a hike in the Federal Fund rate, a drop in the price
level and a contraction in money demand (non-borrowed reserves).
Thus, on the basis of theoretical insights, a-priori a non-zero probability is
attributed only to structural impulse vectors A0;j which, for a given reduced-
form estimate of the VAR, yield impulse-responses whose signs are consistent
with the assumed restrictions. This could be operationalized to characterize
the set of all consistent impulse responses by using the algorithm suggested
by Uhlig [2005]: for a given estimate of the VAR reduced-form matrices ￿
and B(L), and the associated decomposition P; we draw (a large number of)
candidate q vectors from a uniform distribution over Sn, and compute the
associated impulse vector A0;j and impulse response matrix ￿; discarding
those that do not satisfy the assumed sign restrictions. In practice, the q
vectors are drawn from a multivariate standard normal and normalized with
their Euclidean norm to make sure they have unitary length.
It is important to stress that, while allowing to implement in the identi-
￿cation procedure natural theoretical assumptions (e.g., supply-side shocks
should move relative quantities and prices in the opposite direction), sign
restrictions lead to a plurality of candidate structural impulse responses.
Rather than as a shortcoming, this is a potentially important advantage of
this approach, as it allows us to complement our results obtained with exact
restrictions, such as long-run restrictions, that could be sensitive to small
perturbations to model speci￿cation and parameterization.16
As argued by Uhlig [2005], the fact that the Bayesian approach views
the VAR parameters as random variables, makes it particularly suited to
interpreting and implementing sign restrictions. From a Bayesian point of
view, on the one hand, the approach amounts to attributing zero proba-
bility to reduced-form parameter realizations for which impulse responses
contravene the assumed set of sign restrictions. On the other hand, all the
impulse responses from the same reduced-form realization that satisfy those
restrictions are attributed the same posterior probability. We can thus use
16For instance, in order to use long-run restrictions in our previous study (Corsetti et al
[2006]), we had to proceed under the assumption that productivity shocks be exactly non-
stationary and the only source of a stochastic trend in both the level of labor productivity,
and its di⁄erential across countries.
15standard Bayesian methods for estimation and inference, obtaining measures
of the uncertainty about estimated impulse responses.
Under a standard di⁄use prior on the VAR reduced form parameters B (L)
and ￿, and assuming a Gaussian likelihood for the data sample at hand, the
posterior density of the reduced-form VAR parameters with the type of re-
strictions we implement will be proportional to a standard Normal-Wishart
￿ whose parameters are known functions of the OLS-MLE estimates of the
VAR reduced form. Therefore, it is possible to simulate the posterior distri-
bution of impulse responses consistent with our sign restrictions by jointly
drawing from the Normal-Wishart posterior for ￿, B (L) and the uniform
for q over Sn, discarding the impulse responses that violate the restrictions.
It should be kept in mind that, as stressed by Uhlig [2005], the sign restric-
tion approach amounts to estimating simultaneously the coe¢ cients of the
reduced-form VAR and the impulse vector. Draws of the VAR parameters
from their unrestricted posterior which do not admit any impulse vector sat-
isfying the imposed sign restrictions are discarded as they have zero prior
weight.
4 The international dimension of productiv-
ity and demand shocks to US tradables
In this section, we present and discuss our empirical ￿ndings for productivity
and demand shocks identi￿ed using the sign restrictions discussed in Section
2, and conveniently summarized by Table 1, for our estimates with all vari-
ables in levels. Results from extensive sensitivity analysis are discussed in
the next section.
As shown in Table 1, operationally we require our sign restrictions to be
in place for 20 quarters ￿ in the case of the relative price of nontradables
(proxied by the PPI over the services CPI) the restriction is in place only
from the 5th quarter, as to allow for possible short-run e⁄ects of nominal
rigidities. The choice of an horizon of 5 years over which the restrictions are
imposed re￿ ects the prior that these shocks be mildly persistent ￿ e.g. in the
case of an AR(1) with autoregressive coe¢ cient of 0.75 a 1% shock will have
all but died out after 20 quarters ￿ but is somewhat arbitrary. Therefore,
in our robustness exercises, we have also experimented with restrictions over
horizons of 28 and 12 quarters. Only the variables listed in the table are
16restricted: the response of all the other variables included in our analysis ￿
US net exports over GDP, relative consumption and investment, and of all
international relative prices ￿ is left unrestricted.
Table. 1 Sign restrictions on VAR variables
Productivity shock Demand shock
Variable Horizon in quarters Variable Horizon in quarters
LPk ￿ LP ￿
k > 0 k = 1;:::;20 ￿ ￿
Y Tk ￿ Y T ￿
k > 0 k = 1;:::;20 Y Tk ￿ Y T ￿
k > 0 k = 1;:::;20
Y Tk ￿ Yk > 0 k = 1;:::;20 Y Tk ￿ Yk > 0 k = 1;:::;20
PTk=PNk < 0 k = 5;:::;20 PTk=PNk > 0 k = 5;:::;20
In our experiments we typically consider 1000 draws from the posterior,
and 5000 rotations each. Table 2 reports the percentage of accepted reduced
form draws for which we ￿nd at least one vector q satisfying our restrictions.
In our experiments, this percentage is usually well above 95 percent, never
below 80 percent.
4.1 Productivity shocks
The impulse response functions to a positive productivity shock for the spec-
i￿cation in Table 1 are displayed in Figures 1,2, 3 and 5. By way of example,
Figure 1 displays the response of US relative productivity, manufacturing
output (YT-YT*), and aggregate consumption (C-C*), all in log di⁄erential
with ROW, along with (the log of) manufacturing output over real GDP
(YT-Y), the (log of the) PPI relative to the services CPI, and nominal net
trade over GDP (NX/Y). Each ￿gure shows the 16th and 84th percentiles
(the dashed lines) together with the median (the solid line) of the posterior
distribution of the responses satisfying our restrictions in Table 1 for a pro-
ductivity shock. Charts depicting restricted variables include vertical lines,
marking the horizon over which restrictions are imposed. We discuss our
main ￿ndings analyzing each ￿gure in turn.
Consider ￿rst the graphs corresponding to the four restricted variables
in Figure 1. The median e⁄ect of the productivity shock on relative man-
ufacturing output and labor productivity is of the order of 1% and 0.5%,
respectively. The e⁄ect is quite persistent: notably, the 16th percentile of
the productivity response is above zero well beyond the 20 quarters over
17which the sign restriction is imposed. The increase of manufacturing output
over real GDP is slightly smaller and less persistent. Interestingly, however,
the response of (relative) manufacturing output peaks after the ￿rst year fol-
lowing the shock. Finally, the productivity shock leads to a prolonged fall in
the relative price of domestic tradables already from the second quarter after
the shock. This fall corresponds to the HBS e⁄ect, that we impose as restric-
tion from the 5th to the 20th quarter, re￿ ecting the conventional wisdom on
the relative price implications of productivity gains in manufacturing.17
Focusing now on the two unrestricted variables shown in Figure 1, the
responses of relative consumption and net trade are also very substantial
and persistent: the 16th percentile of the response of these variables remains
positive for the entire period (10 years) displayed in the Figure. Relative
consumption rises on impact, and peaks after two years at 0.5%. The fall in
net exports is more gradual: the 85th percentile of its response falls below
zero after two quarters; the median de￿cit gradually reaches -0.1% of GDP
after 4 years.18
The prolonged fall in net exports shown in the Figure 1 may be surprising,
in light of some applied and policy literature postulating that a productivity
increase in tradables should bring about an improvement in net trade. To
investigate the source of the trade deterioration, Figure 2 reproduces the
responses of relative consumption (C-C￿) and net trade, along with relative
private investment (I-I*), the CPI-based real exchange rate (RER), and the
response of real imports and real exports. Note that all the variables in this
￿gure are unrestricted.
Two ￿ndings are worth stressing. First, the deterioration of the trade
balance is essentially driven by a rise in real imports: the response of real
exports is inconclusive. Therefore, the deterioration in net trade is seemingly
17It turns out that it is immaterial for our results whether this restriction is imposed from
the 5th quarter or from the impact response. The immediate drop in this relative prices
makes us con￿dent that our estimates are not contaminated by ￿ news shocks￿of the kind
analyzed by Beaudy and Portier [2005] and Jaimovich and Jaimovich and Rebelo [2008],
since there is no presumption that anticipated supply-side shifts should move current
relative prices and quantities in opposite direction. Interestingly, however, as discussed
below, in our identi￿cation we ￿nd strong wealth and demand e⁄ects.
18A potential concern is that our identi￿cation scheme only picks measurement error
in manufacturing labor productivity, output and the PPI. If this were the case, however,
our overall results would then require this measurement error to be positively correlated
with a very persistent increase in relative aggregate consumption (and investment), and a
deterioration of net exports ￿ a quite far-fetched set of conditions.
18consistent with an increase in US absorption driven by a productivity shock,
as predicted by the standard intertemporal-trade approach to the current ac-
count. Indeed, relative investment rises persistently mimicking the response
of consumption, though it reacts more strongly. Relative investment peaks at
around 2%, and reaches back its previous baseline level after 6 years. Second,
the CPI-based RER persistently appreciates (an increase is an appreciation)
in the aftermath of the shock, then reverts to its baseline, showing some signs
of long-run depreciation.
Because of the positive response of relative consumption, the appreciation
of the CPI-based RER is at odds with standard conditions for perfect con-
sumption risk sharing ￿ but consistent with the unconditional evidence in
Backus and Smith [1993]. This result is of crucial importance in light of the
observation, often made in the literature, that a positive correlation between
relative consumption and real appreciation in the data could be reconciled
with the risk sharing condition (2) to the extent that taste shocks weaken
the link between relative marginal utility and consumption. Remarkably,
our results document that the full risk sharing condition (2) still fails to hold
when measured conditional on productivity shocks only.19
The determinants of the striking response of the real exchange rate are
further investigated in Figure 3. This ￿gure shows the response of three
alternative measures of international relative prices, based on the CPI, the
PPI and the export de￿ ator, respectively ￿ the latter denoted as terms of
trade (TOT) ￿ together with the response of the export de￿ ator for goods
relative to the domestic manufacturing PPI (EXPDEF/PPI). Remarkably,
our three measures of international relative prices display the same apprecia-
tion pattern. As two of our measures are built using PPIs (i.e. price indexes
including a larger share of tradable goods than the CPI) and export de￿ ators
(including only the price of traded goods), our results suggest that the CPI-
based RER appreciation re￿ ects more than the classical HBS hypothesis (i.e.
a rise in the price of nontradables) ￿ in line with the unconditional evidence
in Engel [1999]. As shown in the Figure, real appreciation also re￿ ects sub-
stantial ￿ uctuations in the relative price of US tradables relative to ROW
tradables. Over time, however, US international prices tend to depreciate.
Another intriguing result is that the price of exports in domestic currency
19Here we greatly expand on our previous analysis in Corsetti et al. [2006], where we
only looked at the e⁄ects technology shocks on relative consumption, net trade and relative
prices.
19appears to fall relative to domestic tradables: the 85th percentile of the
response of the US export de￿ ator relative to the PPI is negative for almost
30 quarters. This is consistent with the vast body of evidence on deviations
from the law of one price and destination-speci￿c markup adjustment (e.g.
see the survey by Goldberg and Knetter [1997]). In fact, vis-￿-vis the real
appreciation of the currency, a fall in the export de￿ ator implies that the
US exports price in foreign currency adjusts by less than one-to-one with the
exchange rate (see e.g. Atkeson and Burnstein [2008], Corsetti and Dedola
[2005] for recent analyses).20
To complete our analysis of the response of international prices, Figure
4 shows the probability of RER appreciation and of a TOT improvement,
calculated as the frequency that the impulse responses record a strengthening
of these relative prices. We ￿nd that the probabilities that the real exchange
rate appreciates and that the terms of trade improve are 80 percent or higher
for roughly 5 years, before gradually declining.21
Overall, the evidence displayed in Figures 1 through 4 is consistent with
standard international business cycle models with incomplete markets, fea-
turing strong wealth/demand e⁄ects of productivity shocks. An instance of
model speci￿cations with these characteristics is to be found in related work
of ours (Corsetti Dedola Leduc [2008]): when productivity shocks are persis-
tent, and the long-run price elasticity of exports is high enough, the demand
for tradables rises above supply in the short run, and appreciates the price
of domestic tradable goods relative to Foreign ones. As investment raises
the capital stock, output rises over time, reversing the movements in relative
prices.22
20A di⁄erent (but possibly complementary) interpretation draws on recent literature in
international trade and open economy macroeconomics stressing heterogeneity in produc-
tivity among ￿rms (see e.g. Melitz [2003], Ghironi and Melitz [2006], Eaton and Kortum
[2002]). A fall in export de￿ ator relative to the PPI would obtain if only the most produc-
tive ￿rms export, and/or productivity gains are stronger among exporters. According to
this interpretation, the result in the ￿gure would be driven by changes in marginal costs,
rather than markup adjustment.
21Likewise, we computed the joint probability of a RER appreciation and an increase in
C-C*, quarter by quarter, ￿nding the probability of such an event to be equal to that of
a RER appreciation.
22In our previous work, we stressed the crucial role of a high trade elasticity as a precon-
dition for this dynamic response. A high elasticity contains the adverse movements in the
price of Home tradables when their quantity rises. This means that, other things equal,
the present discounted value of future output is higher, so is the increase in wealth. Note
20The ￿nancial dimension of international transmission is shown in Figure
5. The US stock market increases relative to an aggregate index of foreign
markets. Notably, the relative dollar performance of the US stock market
￿ with a di⁄erential between 2 and 7 percent ￿ is well beyond the esti-
mated rate of real dollar appreciation ￿ which is below 2 percent. Note that
these ￿ndings suggest that international diversi￿cation in equities would pro-
vide US and foreign residents with good opportunities to hedge against the
macroeconomic risks implied by our identi￿ed productivity shocks.
The short-term interest rate di⁄erential is initially zero but becomes pos-
itive (in favor of the US) over time, peaking 10 to 15 quarters after the
shock.23 The positive interest rate di⁄erential emerges as the relative domes-
tic demand boom in response to persistent productivity shocks drives the
trade into de￿cit and appreciates the currency in real terms. The estimated
response of interest rates is consistent with an endogenously countercyclical
stance of monetary policy, leaning against the wind of the perceived demand
expansion.24
Figure 5 also shows that asymmetric positive productivity disturbances
worsen the net foreign asset position of the US ￿ the results in the ￿gure are
based on the times series of valuation-adjusted external assets and liabilities
calculated by Gourinchas and Rey [2007]. So, the widening of the trade
de￿cit discussed earlier is matched by an overall deterioration of the current
account, de￿ned as the di⁄erence in net foreign assets between two points in
time.
Nonetheless, observe that the fall in the US net foreign wealth corre-
sponds to an increase in the stock of both US gross liabilities and US gross
assets (a result also shown, following a di⁄erent methodology, by Corsetti
however that according to our ￿ndings, short-run TOT and RER volatility appears more
consistent with relatively low short-run elasticities, raising interesting issues in possible
di⁄erences in trade elasticities over di⁄erent horizons.
23Comparing this response with that of the real exchange rate, a widening interest
di⁄erential coexists with a stably appreciated exchange rate, suggesting deviations from
uncovered interest parity.
24As shown by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [2002], even allowing for a high degree of
price stickiness, monetary policy cannot by itself generate violations of the risk sharing
condition in economies in which the natural rate allocation has consumption growth sys-
tematically associated with real depreciation. In other words, no appreciation is possible
￿ with or without nominal rigidities ￿ in the absence of strong wealth e⁄ects mirroring
fundamental lack of risk sharing. These e⁄ects simultaneosly drive both the private sector
demand boom, and the policy response to it.
21and Konstantinou [2008]). The rise in the stock of (gross) foreign assets is
somewhat surprising. Since the bulk of the US foreign assets are denominated
in foreign currency, other things equal, the dollar appreciation documented
above tends to reduce the value of their outstanding stock. The observed in-
crease in the value of foreign assets must then be driven by some combination
of capital gains in foreign currency, and positive purchases by US residents.
This evidence on the conditional comovements of foreign assets and liabilities
provides an intriguing empirical benchmark for the recent literature encom-
passing portfolio diversi￿cation in general equilibrium dynamic models after
Devereux and Sutherland [2007].
4.2 Demand shocks
Figures 6 through 8 display the impulse response functions to a positive de-
mand shock for our benchmark speci￿cation, with the same format as Figures
1 to 3 above ￿ each ￿gure reports the 16th and 84th percentiles (the dashed
lines) together with the median (the solid line) of the posterior distribution
of the responses satisfying our restrictions in Table 1 for a demand shock.
As before, vertical lines mark the horizon of restrictions.
Consider Figure 6, presenting the same variables as in Figure 1 ￿ US
relative productivity, manufacturing output (YT-YT*), and aggregate con-
sumption (C-C*), all in log di⁄erential with ROW, along with (the log of)
manufacturing output over real GDP (YT-Y), the (log of the) PPI relative
to the services CPI, and nominal net trade over GDP (NX/Y). Comparing
Figures 1 and 6 makes it clear that the estimated e⁄ects of demand shocks on
YT-YT* and YT-Y are smaller and less persistent than those of productiv-
ity shocks; relative labor productivity in manufacturing (now an unrestricted
variable) slightly rises on impact ￿ a natural interpretation points to short-
run variations in capacity utilization corresponding to a demand-driven rise
in production ￿ but remains una⁄ected over time. Consumption and net
exports do not appear to respond with a large probability.
Aggregate e⁄ects of the shock can instead be detected for variables such
as investment, and international relative prices. In Figure 7, the 16th per-
centile of investment is positive between the 15th and the 25th quarter. Yet,
the movement in investment is much smaller than its counterpart after a pro-
ductivity shock. While real imports do not move appreciably, exports in real
terms tend to fall moderately over time: the 85th percentile of the respose
becomes negative after quarter 20. The CPI-based RER does not respond on
22impact ￿ the median response slightly depreciates. However this variable
clearly appreciates after three years, notably around the peak of the invest-
ment response. This is so despite the pressure towards real depreciation due
to the persistent increase in the price of manufacturing output relative to
nontradables displayed in Figure 6.
Figure 8 con￿rms our previous results, that the response of international
relative prices has common determinants going beyond and even countervail-
ing the HBS e⁄ect on the US relative price of nontradables: All measures
of international prices show the same pattern, appreciating between 3 and 4
years after the shock. Nonetheless, observe that the response of the relative
price of export goods relative to overall manufacturing is basically zero, a
result which squares well with the presumption that the origin of the shock
is mostly domestic. Actually, the slight fall in the median of this relative
price is again consistent with imperfect exchange rate pass-through vis-￿-vis
the currency appreciation (a point already discussed at length in relation to
productivity shocks).
Figure 9 shows that demand shocks appear to have little impact on rel-
ative US stock prices and interest rates. While net foreign assets ￿ once
again using valuation-corrected data ￿ remain utterly una⁄ected, we detect
a small increase in the stocks of both gross assets and liabilities. For the
former, the 16th percentile of the response rises above zero between the 5th
and the 15th quarter.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we report on the sensitivity of our results along a number of
dimensions. First, we vary the horizon over which sign restrictions are im-
posed, adding or subtracting 8 quarters relative to the baseline speci￿cation
in Table 1. Second, we study both shocks simultaneously imposing that they
are orthogonal to each other. Third, we address the symmetry assumptions
implicit in de￿ning variable as di⁄erentials between the US and the rest of the
sample. Fourth, we test variants of our sign restrictions and alternative spec-
i￿cations of the model. Finally, observe that as a by-product of the analysis
above we experimented with a large set of alternative speci￿cations of the
model. For instance, we included di⁄erent measures of international relative
price ￿ using a PPI- instead of a CPI-based real exchange rate. None of
the alternative speci￿cations we experimented with displays any signi￿cant
23impact on our benchmark results reported above.
Varying the restriction horizon All our results are broadly unchanged
when we re-estimate the VAR model imposing our set of restrictions over an
horizon which is shorter than in our baseline speci￿cation. In the case of pro-
ductivity shocks, for instance, the main detectable e⁄ects of shortening the
(upper) restriction horizon from 20 to 12 quarters (while exactly replicating
the analysis in all other dimensions) is that the response of all variables to
the productivity shock becomes less persistent.
By the same token, imposing that our restrictions bind for up to 28 quar-
ters, i.e. 8 quarters more than our baseline case, increases the persistence
of the estimated e⁄ects of productivity and demand shocks, as expected.
However, lengthening the restriction horizon makes it more di¢ cult to ￿nd
productivity shocks in the data ￿ we end up rejecting a somewhat larger
fraction of draws from the reduced form posterior of our VAR. Similar con-
siderations apply to the case of demand shocks. To save space, we do not
report ￿gures for these exercises.
Orthogonal productivity and demand shocks In our analysis, we re-
quire the two shocks to have opposite e⁄ects on the US relative price of
tradables vis-￿-vis CPI services, while always increasing US manufacturing
output relative to real GDP. In this respect, our identi￿cation strategy limits
the risk that our results confound their e⁄ects. Yet, as we identify productiv-
ity and demand shocks individually, without requiring that both be present
in the data and be orthogonal to each other, our estimated e⁄ects of either
shock could potentially be biased ￿ for instance, if the two shocks happen
to be negatively correlated with each other. Speci￿cally, in the case of the
demand shock, it may happen that some of the estimated responses, while
picking up the assumed positive demand shock, could be contaminated by a
(weaker) negative productivity shock. For instance, this could have the e⁄ect
of strengthening the positive response of the relative price of tradables, while
attenuating that of other variables, like relative output or consumption.
The change in the procedure described in Section 3 needed to produce
two sets of candidate impulse responses which are orthogonal on impact is
straightforward. We now need to ￿nd two vectors, q1 and q2; both belong-
ing to the hypersphere of unitary radius Sn ￿ Rn; which also satisfy the
additional orthogonality condition q0
1q2 = 0; then, we can compute the two
24impulse vectors Pq1 and Pq2 and the related impulse responses, verifying
that they satisfy the sign restrictions for productivity and demand shocks.
In practice, the vectors are again drawn from a multivariate standard normal,
then orthogonalized and normalized with their Euclidean norm to make sure
they have unitary length.
Orthogonality may have a further important consequence for our results.
Since the number of restrictions imposed simultaneously is larger, it may be
more di¢ cult to ￿nd the two shocks in the data, leading us to reject a much
higher number of reduced forms in our estimation procedure. This could
a⁄ect our ￿ndings, that each shock individually is very likely to be present in
the data. Yet, when we estimate orthogonal productivity and demand shocks
imposing the restrictions in the two columns of Table 1 simultaneously, we
￿nd virtually no di⁄erence from the results for each shock in isolation. Once
again, to save space, we do not report ￿gures for these exercises.
Cross-country symmetry An important robustness check consists in test-
ing whether the symmetry assumption implicit in estimating VARs in cross-
country di⁄erentials be a source of bias in our results. To address this speci-
￿cation issue we ￿rst investigated potential sources of bias by regressing the
residuals from our baseline six-variable speci￿cation of the VAR model on
the levels of all our variables, for both the US and the rest of the world.
Second, we re-estimate our model using a larger VAR, in which we include
the variable(s) which turn out to be signi￿cant in the auxiliary regressions
estimated in the ￿rst step.
Interestingly, the only such variable in the auxiliary regressions is pro-
ductivity in manufacturing in the US ￿ suggesting that its speci￿cation in
the benchmark VAR in di⁄erential with the rest of the world could be a po-
tential source of bias. Thus we re-estimate a seven-variable VAR, including
this variable, left unconstrained, in order to keep our identi￿cation unal-
tered. The results from this exercise are broadly similar to those from our
benchmark. This is clearly shown by Figure 10, which displays a selection
of our variables, using the same format as before ￿ each chart display the
16th and 84th percentiles (the dashed lines) together with the median (the
solid line) of the posterior distribution of the responses satisfying the restric-
tions. Notably, the level of US labor productivity in manufacturing, which is
left unconstrained, rises persistently with a high probability, closely mirror-
ing the response of the (constrained) productivity di⁄erential; all the other
25variables, both restricted (YT-YT*, YT-Y and PPI/CPI) and unrestricted,
behave in a similar way as before under the symmetric speci￿cation. Overall,
this is evidence that the symmetry assumption does not appear to drive our
￿ndings in a signi￿cant way.
Changing sign restrictions As seen above, the response of many macro
variables to demand shocks identi￿ed according to our benchmark scheme
tends to be subdued. As a robustness exercise, we check the implications
of imposing the additional restriction that relative consumption increases in
response to demand disturbances for 8 quarters. The goal of this experiment
is to verify whether a more restricted speci￿cation, isolating sharply the
e⁄ects of demand shocks with a prevailing domestic origin in one important
component of absorption, would result into more conclusive results for a
larger set of variables.
We ￿nd that demand shocks associated with an increase in relative con-
sumption tend to have stronger e⁄ects on trade variables, as the response of
gross and net exports now becomes clearly negative. However, these shocks
now have weaker e⁄ects on investment and international relative prices, as
shown in Figure 11 and 12, reproducing the responses of the same variables
as in Figure 6 and 7, respectively.
Speci￿cally, consider Figure 11, including the same variables as in Figure 6
￿ US relative productivity, manufacturing output (YT-YT*), and aggregate
consumption (C-C*), all in log di⁄erential with ROW, along with (the log of)
manufacturing output over real GDP (YT-Y), the (log of the) PPI relative to
the services CPI, and nominal net trade over GDP (NX/Y). The estimated
e⁄ects of demand shocks on relative consumption (restricted in Figure 11
to increase for the ￿rst 2 years) and net exports are now much more clear
cut, with the latter turning negative for some periods. Figure 12 shows that
the trade de￿cit mainly re￿ ects a persistent drop in real exports, while the
response of real imports appear inconclusive. Relative to Figure 7, however,
the response of investment and the CPI-based RER is now much smaller and
also inconclusive.
This robustness experiment shows that augmenting with further restric-
tions our benchmark scheme for demand shocks leads to the identi￿cation of
a demand disturbance with quite di⁄erent e⁄ects from those estimated under
the benchmark. This supports the notion that our benchmark restrictions
are isolating the e⁄ects of a speci￿c demand shock to US manufacturing,
26whose aggregate e⁄ects materialize mainly on international relative prices
and on domestic components of investment, but not in consumption and net
trade.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide novel empirical evidence on the international di-
mension of productivity and demand shocks in the US, vis-￿-vis an aggregate
of other large industrial countries. Identi￿cation is based on sign restrictions
derived from clear-cut and robust predictions by standard theory, regarding
the e⁄ects of shocks concentrated in the tradable sector. Relative to the ex-
isting literature, our contribution is novel in that it applies to international
data VAR methods with minimal identifying assumptions, but strong theo-
retical underpinnings, to document both the real and ￿nancial channels of
the international transmission in detail. For all our results, we conduct exten-
sive robustness analysis, changing the speci￿cation of the model, varying the
restrictions￿horizon, including additional variables, imposing orthogonality
between shocks, or changing variables￿de￿nitions.
Our study provides evidence on the cross-country transmission of US
structural demand and supply shocks in remarkable agreement with what we
have called the popular market and policy view. First, we ￿nd that sectoral
demand shocks in US tradables, while having limited aggregate e⁄ects on
absorption and net trade, still a⁄ect speci￿c demand components, especially
investment, and appreciate the real value of the dollar. Second and more
strikingly, we ￿nd that sectoral productivity shocks in US tradables have a
non-trivial impact on aggregate demand, suggesting that an important di-
mension of their transmission operates via intertemporal general equilibrium
e⁄ects on cross-country wealth. Namely, our identi￿ed productivity shocks
boost US consumption and investment, relative to the rest of the world, thus
raising real imports. The overall deterioration of the US trade balance is
then matched by a fall in the (valuation adjusted) stock of US net foreign
assets. The value of the US stock market persistently rises above the market
value abroad. Over time, the domestic short-term interest rate rises above
the foreign one. We also ￿nd that all our measures of international relative
prices ￿ CPI-based, PPI-based and export-de￿ ator based exchange rates
￿ appreciate in response to these shocks, although they tend to depreciate
below their initial levels in the long run.
27The implied wealth and aggregate demand e⁄ects of productivity shocks
are at odds with a key transmission channel typically postulated by textbook
open-economy models ￿ that a higher supply of tradables must be matched
by a fall in a country￿ s terms of trade ￿ , and have important implications
for cross-country risk sharing. As pointed out by Cole and Obstfeld [1991],
a fall in international relative prices of domestic tradables partly o⁄setting
productivity and output di⁄erentials would provide consumption risk insur-
ance by containing di⁄erences in national demand and wealth: international
price movements would then substitute for asset income payments from in-
ternationally diversi￿ed portfolios. In contrast, our estimates suggest that
movements in the international prices of US traded goods and consumption
are far from providing risk insurance against US productivity ￿ uctuations ￿
while movements in relative prices of assets such as stocks apparently do.
Our results complement the ￿ndings in Backus and Smith [1993] that
domestic consumption on average rises when the currency appreciates, by
showing that this feature of the data also emerges conditional on identi￿ed
productivity shocks only. Not only is this clear evidence of lack of consump-
tion risk sharing vis-￿-vis productivity disturbances, together with the rest
of our analysis, it emphasizes imperfect risk sharing as an essential element
in the characterization of the transmission mechanism, and suggests that
strong wealth e⁄ects play an important role in generating aggregate demand
￿ uctuations across countries.
In this sense, our ￿ndings provide an empirical benchmark for the de-
velopment of open economy models, and a base for further theoretical and
empirical investigation. There is a clear need for reconsidering mechanisms
through which structural shocks can generate sizeable wedges between do-
mestic and foreign demand ￿ a task which has been recently pursued by
developing open economy models under the assumption of incomplete mar-
kets, emphasizing the role of relative wealth e⁄ects and/or market dynamics,
but that could also motivate new directions for research on global macroeco-
nomic interdependence.
28Appendix 1 Data description and sources
United States
Labor productivity: Index of output per hour of all persons in manufacturing
sector, seasonally adjusted, 1992 = 100 (Bank of International Settlements
and Dept. of Labor).
Manufacturing output: Index of industrial production in manufacturing, sea-
sonally adjusted, 2000 = 100 (Federal Reserve Board)
Consumption: Private ￿nal consumption expenditure, volume in national
currency, seasonally adjusted (OECD, Economic Outlook Database).
Nominal GDP: Gross domestic product, value, market prices in national cur-
rency, seasonally adjusted (OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
Net exports:Nominal net exports of goods & services, value in national cur-
rency, seasonally adjusted (OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
Real imports and exports:Real imports and exports of goods, national cur-
rency, seasonally adjusted, 2000 = 100 (NIPA, Table 4.2.3)
PPI index: Producer price index of manufactured products, seasonally ad-
justed, 2000 = 100 (OECD, Main Economic Indicators Database)
CPI total: Consumer price index all items, seasonally adjusted, 2000 = 100
(OECD, Main Economic Indicators Database)
CPI services: Consumer price index for services less energy services, season-
ally adjusted; 1982-84 = 100, monthly converted to quarterly averages (BLS)
Export de￿ ator: Exports of goods, de￿ ator, seasonally adjusted, national ac-
counts basis; 2000 = 100 (OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
Short-term rate: Federal Fund Rate, quarterly (IMF, International Financial
Statistics)
Stock prices: Share Prices, quarterly (IMF, International Financial Statis-
tics)
US Foreign assets and liabilities:Valuation adjusted US net foreign assets,
gross foreign assets and gross foreign liabilities (Gourinchas and Rey [2007],
iAppendix B)
CPI-based real exchange rate: Index of ratio of US CPI (total) to aggregate
CPI (total) of 9 OECD countries, all in current US dollars, weighted with
GDP shares at annual PPP values, 1970q1 = 100 (authors calculations based
on OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
PPI-based real exchange rate: Index of ratio of US PPI (manufacturing)
to aggregate PPI (manufacturing) of 9 OECD countries, all in current US
dollars, weighted with GDP shares at annual PPP values, 1971q1 = 100 (au-
thors calculations based on OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
Terms of trade: Index of ratio of US export de￿ ator (goods and services) to
aggregate export de￿ ator (goods and services) of 9 OECD countries, all in
current US dollars, weighted with GDP shares at annual PPP values, 1970q1
= 100 (authors calculations based on OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
Relative stock prices: Index of ratio of US stock prices to aggregate stock
prices of 9 OECD countries, all in current US dollars, weighted with GDP
shares at annual PPP values, 1970q1 = 100 (authors calculations based on
IMF, International Financial Statistics)
Rest of the world
The rest of the world comprises Japan, Germany, UK, Italy, France,
Canada, Australia, Sweden and Ireland. This choice was dictated by data
availability regarding hourly productivity in manufacturing.
Individual country￿ s variables were aggregated by ￿rst taking quarterly
growth rates to remove national basis e⁄ects; then cross-country average
growth rates were computed with weights based on each country￿ s GDP
share in the 9-country aggregate calculated at annual purchasing power parity
(PPP) values. Average growth rates were then cumulated starting from the
initial base year to obtain levels.
Annual PPP based GDP shares are from the IMF￿ s World Economic
Outlook Database from 1980; before 1980 they were computed directly on
the basis of annual GDP at PPP values form OECD￿ s Economic Outlook
Database.
Labor productivity: Aggregate of country-speci￿c indexes of output per hour
of all persons in manufacturing sector, seasonally adjusted, 1970q1 = 100 (au-
iithors calculations based on national statistical sources, BIS and IMF)
Manufacturing output: Aggregate of country-speci￿c indexes of industrial
production, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, 1970q1 = 100 (authors cal-
culations based on national statistical sources, BIS and IMF)
Consumption and investment: Aggregate of country-speci￿c private ￿nal con-
sumption expenditure, volumes in national currency, seasonally adjusted,
1970q1 = 100 (authors calculations based on OECD, Economic Outlook
Database).
Stock prices: Aggregate of country-speci￿c share prices, 1970q1 = 100 (au-
thors calculations based on IMF, International Financial Statistics and BIS
(for UK only)).
Short-term rates: Weighted average with PPP GDP weights of country-
speci￿c gross short-term rates (authors calculations based on IMF, Inter-
national Financial Statistics).
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